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Trusting other people is essential for modern societies, in which the sheer complexity of
interpersonal relationships renders more traditional control-based strategies of interpersonal
cooperation increasingly inefficient (Luhmann, 1979). There is no agreed-upon standard definition
of the concept of trust, but the key idea is that “trusting a person means believing that when offered
the chance, he or she is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to us” (Gambetta, 1988, p.
219). While beliefs need not necessarily be supported by reasons, people often do trust a trustee
more in the face of information that allows predicting his or her behavior. This means that a core
aspect of trust consists in social predictability.
How does trust work? In the following, we suggest that trust reflects the absence of aversive
uncertainty, which in turn depends on the degree to which the representation of another person
overlaps with a representation of oneself. Based on the theory of event coding (Hommel et al., 2001)
we explain how people represent themselves and others, how representational overlap determines
trust, how that is affected by the situational context and the trustor’s current mindset, and what this
implies for interventions to induce and increase interpersonal trust.
Representing Oneself and Others
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC: Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009) aims to explain how
people represent events they perceive and events they produce—perceptions and actions that is. In
a nutshell, TEC claims that: (a) Perceptual events and planned actions are cognitively represented
by event codes; (b) which are integrated assemblies of feature codes (Hommel, 2004); (c) which in
turn are cognitive/brain states correlated with external (perceived or self-generated) features (distal
coding: Prinz, 1992); (d) which implies that the basic units of both perception and action (assemblies
of feature codes) are sensorimotor entities, in the sense that they are activated by sensory input
(=perception) and controlling motor output (=action).
Originally, TEC has been developed to represent relatively simple stimuli and actions but more
recently we have begun to explore whether and how the theory can be extended to represent
social events. Interestingly, Greenwald et al. (2002) have suggested a theoretical account of self-
representation that seems perfectly compatible with such a social extension of TEC. It is true
that representing people and social events would necessarily require a greater complexity of the
representational dimensions than was necessary for TECs original focus on colors, shapes, and
other simple features, but TECs basic architecture and computational principles allow for that. In
particular, TEC provides the mechanisms needed to represent oneself in terms of one’s perceptual
and action-contingent features and the same is true for other individuals (Hommel et al., 2009;
Hommel, 2013). The basic idea is sketched in Figure 1: In the example, an agent is assumed to
represent herself (Me node) with respect to 3 features (α, β, γ—e.g., being female, tall, and a student)
and another person (Other) with respect to 4 features (γ, δ, ε, ζ—e.g., being a student, male, short,
and a father).
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FIGURE 1 | Representation of oneself (Me) and another person (Other)
in terms of situationally relevant features, of which one (γ) is shared.
The relationship between the two representations is determined by (a) the
structural feature overlap (the number of all features that are shared); (b) the
situationally primed (“intentionally weighted”) features; and (c) the
inclusivity/exclusivity of the processing mode.
The relationship between representations of one person
(including oneself) and another is determined by three factors.
First, two representations can structurally overlap to different
degrees, depending on the number of features they share. In
the example, only one feature is shared, which creates only little
overlap. If the agent would meet another tall, female student,
the overlap will be considerable. Second, features that relate to
the agent’s current intentions are “primed” (i.e., receive higher
“intentional weighting,” cf., Memelink and Hommel, 2013),
which enables or increases their impact on cognitive processes.
It is because of this mechanism that only a few features are
considered in the example. In addition to the three mentioned
features, the agent will have many more features, such as a
particular hair color, hairdo, age, skin color, dress, and so
forth. The example assumes that all these additional features
are currently not important (and not particularly salient, which
would attract attention exogenously) and, therefore, effectively
“invisible.” Third, people have cognitive control over their style
of decision-making by biasing it to be either more “exclusive”
or more “inclusive” (Colzato et al., 2013b; Hommel, 2015).
Technically, this can be expressed as the mutual inhibition
between alternative events (indicated by the symmetric inhibitory
link between Me and Other), which can be either strong (as
in the exclusive mode) or weak (as in the inclusive mode). An
inclusive mode would thus tend to treat Me and Other as one
event (similar to visual grouping according to Gestalt principles)
while an exclusive mode would tend to render them separate
events (Hommel, 2015).
Predictability and Trust
Our main hypothesis is that the degree of interpersonal
similarity (i.e., the functional overlap between Me and Other)
determines the degree of trust for the Other. The starting
point of our consideration is the assumption that trust depends
on predictability by definition—the better we can predict the
behavior of someone, the better we can judge whether “he or she
is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to us” (Gambetta,
1988, p. 219). Predictability is the inverse of uncertainty, which
is known to be aversive. For instance, there is evidence that the
creation of response uncertainty by priming alternative incorrect
responses triggers negative affective states to signal the need for
conflict resolution to cognitive-control systems (van Steenbergen
et al., 2009, 2015). Along the same lines, uncertainty in predicting
the behavior of another person would result in the activation of
multiple representations of possible actions, which induces a kind
of response conflict. As this generates negative affective states,
the negativity of the state would directly indicate the degree
of appropriate trust. This need not be the only informational
source that people consider when judging the trustworthiness of
someone (e.g., social values may make one trust irrespective of
one’s feelings: Joosten et al., 2015), but we assume that it does
make a particularly important contribution.
Considering the connection between predictability and trust,
it makes sense to assume that trust increases as a function
of the amount of knowledge available to predict the behavior
of someone. Given that the most knowledge we have about
ourselves (at least if it comes to the prediction of behavior), we
would not only be able to predict the behavior of ourselves the
best but also be good in predicting the behavior of people that
are very similar to us. According to our theoretical approach, the
representations of oneself and of another person differ only in
degrees, which suggests that the degree of me-other similarity or
congruency determines how much one trusts another. As this
similarity/congruency depends on the amount of situationally
relevant features that one shares with the other and the
exclusivity/inclusivity of one’s current processing mode, we can
thus predict that the degree of trust between trustor and trustee
should increase with the situationally relevant interpersonal
similarity in the inclusivity of the trustor’s processing mode.
Improving Trust
Our approach suggests basically three ways to improve (or
reduce) interpersonal trust. First, if trust is derived from the
degree of negative affect, it should be affected by emotional
factors. While the degree of negative affect would normally
reflect the degree of uncertainty-induced conflict, conflict-
driven affective cues (that we assume to provide input for
trust calculation) can be overwritten by external reward (van
Steenbergen et al., 2009) and positive mood (van Steenbergen
et al., 2010), suggesting that trust could be enhanced by these two
factors. Indeed, Mislin et al. (2015) showed that trust increases as
a function of both the trustor’s mood and the received reward.
These two factors interacted with one compensating for the
other, suggesting that they indeed relate to the same mechanism.
However, note that our approach over-justifies the impact of
emotional factors in two ways. For one, positive mood and affect
can not only overwrite conflict-induced negative affective signals
but also induce more integrative processing modes (Dreisbach
and Goschke, 2004)—which we also assume to increase trust.
While this makes emotion-related predictions even stronger, it
also makes successful predictions difficult to trace back to the
actual mechanism. For another, mood and processing modes
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seem to share neural mechanisms and may thus not constitute
separable causal factors: Relative increases in striatal dopamine
seem to constitute central components of both positive mood
(Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2012a) and more integrative
control states (Cools, 2006), and not only does positive-going
mood make processing modes more integrative but engaging in
integrative processing also improves mood (Akbari Chermahini
and Hommel, 2012b).
Second, if trust relates to self-other similarity, it should
increase with this similarity. Indeed, facial similarity between
trustor and trustee promotes attributions of trustworthiness
(DeBruine, 2005; Bailenson et al., 2008) and cooperation in trust-
related economic games (DeBruine, 2002; Krupp et al., 2008).
Reversely, faces of people that either look (Verosky and Todorov,
2010) or behave (Farmer et al., 2013) untrustworthy are viewed
as less similar to oneself.
Third, if trust is sensitive to the processing mode, it
should be more pronounced under conditions that promote
a more inclusive mode. To test this prediction, Sellaro et al.
(2014a) have used creativity tasks to bias the processing
mode of trustors before playing a Trust Game (Camerer and
Weigelt, 1988). Previous studies have shown that engaging in
convergent thinking promotes a focused, exclusive processing
mode while engaging in divergent thinking promotes a
distributed, inclusive processing mode (e.g., Fischer and
Hommel, 2012). As predicted, trustors transferred significantly
more money to trustees after engaging in divergent thinking
as compared to convergent thinking, which confirms our
prediction that an inclusive processing mode promotes
trust.
Another study used the food supplement L-tryptophan,
a precursor of serotonin, to promote interpersonal trust.
Tryptophan depletion was found to improve performance in
tasks that require focusing on relevant and ignoring irrelevant
information, such as the Stroop task, in healthy and depressed
participants (Rowley et al., 1998; Schmitt et al., 2000; Booij et al.,
2005). This suggests that tryptophan depletion promotes a more
focused, exclusive processing mode, which in turn implies that
the administration of tryptophan promotes an integrative mode.
Colzato et al. (2013a) exposed healthy participants to a dose of
either tryptophan or a placebo before having them engage in a
Trust Game. As predicted, trustors transferred more money to
their trustees after the intake of tryptophan. Along those same
lines, Steenbergen et al. (2014) reported that the administration
of tryptophan increases the probability to engage in charitable
donation.
Finally, there is evidence that trust can be improved by
means of fragrance. Available evidence suggests that arousing
fragrances, like peppermint, induce a more exclusive processing
mode while calming scents, like lavender, induce a more
integrative mode (e.g., Herz, 2009). Accordingly, Sellaro et al.
(2014b) had participants play a Trust Game while being exposed
to the scent of peppermint or lavender. As predicted, trustors
transferred significantly more money to trustees in the lavender
as compared to the peppermint and a control condition.
Conclusion
We suggest that interpersonal trust is a function of the perceived
similarity between trustor and trustee, and have suggested a
concrete functional mechanism how this similarity is represented
in the cognitive system. The available evidence provides support
for three key predictions of our approach: that trust increases
with positive emotions and the degree of functional trustor-
trustee feature overlap, and with a more integrative processing
mode of the trustor. Other implications of our approach were
not yet tested, such as the assumption that perceived self-
other similarity is mediated by the situational relevance of
the represented features, which calls for studies in which this
relevance is systematically varied. Nevertheless, we consider it
interesting that social behavior can be predicted based on a
model that was originally developed to account for entirely
nonsocial agent-environment interactions. Also of interest, we
have successfully applied the same approach to account for
phenomena of social conformity (Kim and Hommel, 2015),
which provides converging evidence that important kinds of
social behavior may be generated by not dedicatedly social,
domain-general cognitive mechanisms.
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